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MEDICAL HOPE, LEGAL PITFALLS:
POTENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES IN THE EMERGING
FIELD OF ONCOFERTILITY
Gregory Dolin, M.D., J.D.*
Dorothy E. Roberts, J.D. **
Lina M. Rodriguez***
Teresa K. Woodruff, Ph.D. ****

L INTRODUCTION
The United States annually spends over $200 billion on
cancer treatment and research. 1 Over the past several
decades, tremendous progress has been made in combating
this disease. The five-year survival rate for cancer has
increased from thirty-five percent in 1950-1954 to sixty-seven
percent in 1996-2004. Moreover, over the last forty years,
survival rates for childhood cancer have risen from twenty
percent to eighty-one percent. 2 However, the very success of
new and improved therapies has created a host of problems
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Pauline Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and 2007-08 John M. Olin Fellow in Law, Northwestern University
School of Law.
Johns Hopkins University; J.D., Georgetown Universij;v
Law Center; M.D., State University of New York at Stony Brook.
** Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law;
Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy Research. B.A., Yale College; J.D., Harvard
Law School.
** B.A., M.D.
2011), Northwestern University.
*** Thomas J. Watkins Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology; Director, the
Oncofertility Consortium; Director, the Institute for Women's Health Research
at Northwestern University, Feinberg School of Medicine.
B.S., Olivet
Nazarene University; Ph.D. Northwestern University.
1. See NAT'L CANCER INST., THE NATION'S INVESTl\fENT IN CANCER
RESEARCH:
A PLAL'T AND BUDGET FOR FY2009 4 (2008), available at
http://plan.cancer.gov/pdflnci_2009_plan.pdf (stating that the 2006 budget was
$203.6 billion).
2. NAT'L CANCER INST., SEER CANCER STATIS'l'ICS REVIEW 1975-2005, at
31
tbl.I-3
(200S),
available
at
http://seer.cancer.gov/csrI1975_2005/results_merged/sect_01_overview. pdf.
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that were not previously considered. One of the results of the
increased rate of post-cancer survival is the commensurate
desire of former cancer patients to return to healthy lives,
which for many includes having children. 3 Unfortunately, for
many this desire is difficult to fulfill, because the medication
that succeeded in battling cancer is also quite often toxic to
the reproductive organs. 4 Thus, many people are able to live
longer lives, yet feel that their lives are incomplete because
they became infertile. 5 Whereas in the past fertility was not
even part of the discussion when deciding on the proper
treatment,6 now it is a top concern of many newly diagnosed
cancer patients. 7
In response to this concern, medical researchers are
investigating several approaches to preserve cancer patients'
reproductive options. 8 This new medical field has been
christened "oncofertility," a portmanteau9 meant to connote
the focus on both oncology and fertility preservation.
In October 2007, the National Institutes of Health
awarded a multi-million dollar grant 10 to the Oncofertility
Consortiuml l to study and address the reproductive needs
3. See Carrie Nieman et aI., Fertility Preservation and Adolescent Cancer
Patients: Lessons from Adult Survivors of Childhood Cancer and Their Parents,
in ONCOFERTHJTY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SURVIVORS 201, 208
(Teresa K. Woodruff & Karrie Ann Snyder eds., 2007).
4. See Teresa K. Woodruff, The Emergence of a New Interdiscipline:
Oncofertility, in ONCOFERTIUTY: FERTIUTY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER
SURVIVORS, supra note 3, at 3, 5.
5. See Karrie Ann Snyder, Oncofertility and the Social Sciences, in
ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CA;'<CER SURVIVORS, supra note
3, at 137, 14l.
6. See Nieman et aI., supra note 3, at 208 ("Most [cancer patients] did not
remember discussing fertility with their physicians ....").
7. See Matthew J. Loscalzo & Karen L. Clark, The Psychological Context of
Cancer-Related Infertility, in ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR
CAc~CER SURVIVORS, supra note 3, at 180, 182-83.
8. See infra Part III.
9. Lewis Carroll, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, AND WHA'r ALICE FOUND
THERE 67 (University of California Press 1983) ("You see it's like a
portmanteau-there are two meanings packed up into one word.").
10. Nat'l lnets. of Health Grant No. U54RR024347 (2007), described in
Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, NIH Launches
Interdisciplinary Research Consortia (Sept. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/sep2007/od-06.htm.
11. "The Oncofertility Consortium is a national, interdisciplinary initiative
designed to explore the reproductive future of cancer survivors."
The
Oncofertility Consortium, About Us, http://oncofertility.northwestern.eduiabout
us (last visited Dec. 20, 2008).
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and choices of female cancer patients. 12 Like many scientific
breakthroughs, especially ones dealing with human
reproduction, the Oncofertility Project enters an area of legal
and ethical uncertainty.13 As the scientific and medical
advances in the field of oncofertility are made, researchers,
doctors, and patients need to be aware of hidden legal pitfalls
and hazards. This article will pose some legal questions that
are likely to arise in the field of oncofertility. Mter posing
these questions, the article will apply now-existing legal
principles in order to develop a framework for answering
these questions.
The article will begin its discussion by identifying the
values at stake in the field of oncofertility. These values
include the constitutional protection of the rights of women
and minors to bear children and to use reproduction-assisting
technologies, as well as the feminist critique of gendered
expectations that may pressure women to use these
technologies.
Part III will focus on the medical options of oncofertility.
It will also discuss some conditions that may lead otherwise
fertile and young patients to lose their ability to bear children
as a side-effect of necessary medical treatment. The article
will then proceed to discuss briefly the current state of the art
and the various medical options available to patients wishing
to preserve fertility.
Mter laying out both the medico-scientific and legal
groundwork, the article will then address the potential legal
questions that may emerge as the field of oncofertility
develops. Can or must parents consent to a "medically
unnecessary" surgery on behalf of a child to preserve her
fertility? Who owns the excised tissue and the gametes
contained within it? Additionally, legal issues that arise in
conducting research on excised tissues for the purposes of
future reproduction will be discussed. We avoid making
definitive predictions of what the law relating to oncofertility
will look like. Rather, our purpose is to suggest a framework
based on the current state of the law which can help to
answer these questions.
12. See The Oncofertility Consortium, supra note II.
13. The joined efforts of several institutions comprising the Oncofertility
Consortium on medical, scientific, legal, economic, and other fronts, will be
referred to here as the "Oncofertility Project."
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II. WHAT IS AT STAKE?

A. Is There a Right to Reproduce?
The right to reproduce is firmly entrenched in American
and internationallawY The United States Supreme Court
has declared and reaffirmed the right to bear children in
several decisions. For instance, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,15 the
Court defined this right as "fundamental to the very existence
of the [human] race."16 Subsequent cases involving the right
to use contraceptives made clear that substantive due process
guarantees the right to reproductive decision-making. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,17 protecting married couples' right to
use contraceptives, the Court described reproductive freedom
as "older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political
parties, older than our school system.... and intimate to the
degree of being sacred."18 Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 19
the Court extended this protection to unmarried people,
holding that the right to privacy encompasses the "right of
the individual, married or single, to" make his own decisions
as to "whether to bear or beget a child."20 In a line of cases
beginning with Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,21 the Supreme Court held that minors, no less than
adults, possess the right to decide whether to bear a child. 22
14. DOROTHY ROBERTS. KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 182 (1997) (noting that the right of privacy "is
universally recognized to include the decision to bear a child," but criticizing the
dominant view of reproductive liberty for failing to take social justice into
account); JOFL.'\ A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVlij TECHNOLOGIES 131 (1994) (arguing that the right to procreate is
constitutionally protected and extends to reproduction-assisting technologies).
15. Skinner v. Ok!. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
16. Id. at 541.
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. Id. at 486.
19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 UB. 438 (1972).
20. [d. at 453.
21. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
22. Id. at 522-23. In Akron, the Court held that a minor can decide on her
own whether to undergo an abortion if she is sufficiently mature. [d. Casey and
subsequent courts held to the same view. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). While upholding the requirement of parental
consent, the Akron Court required a judicial bypass mechanism where a mature
minor could demonstrate her maturity and decide the matter on her own.
Akron, 497 U.S. at 510-11 ("[I]n order to prevent another person from having an
absolute veto power over a minor's decision to have an abortion, a State must
provide some sort of bypass procedure ifit elects to require parental consent.")
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In addition to being firmly embedded in U.S. case law,
the right to reproduce is also protected under international
law. For instance, the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights proclaims that "[m1en and women of full age
... have the right'to marry and to found a family."23 The
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights states that "[t]he right ... to found a family shall be
recognized."24 The European Convention on Human Rights
also adheres to this view. 25 The Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam,26 adopted in response to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,27 states that "[t]he family is the
foundation of society . . . ."28 Though coming to differing
conclusions on the ultimate issue of the possession of frozen
embryos, both the European Court for Human Rights and the
Supreme Court of Israel held that a right to "become a
parent" is a fundamental human right.29 In short, the right to
have children is a nearly universally acknowledged and
honored right.30
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), art. 16(1),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. Al810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
art. 23(2), Dec. 16,
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 179 ("The right of men and women of marriageable age to
marry and to found a family shall be recognized."). The United States is a
signatory to this Covenant, and has formally ratified it, though with some
reservations. See 138 CONGo REc. S8068-71 (1992).
25. European Convention for the Protection of Humau Rights aud
Fundamental Freedoms art. 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 ("Men and
women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family ...
.").
26. The Cairo Declaratiou on Human Rights in
5, 1990, World
Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.157/PC/621Add.18 (June 9,
1993) [hereinafter Cairo Declaration], available at http://wwwLumn.eduJ
humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html.
27. Some Muslim countries objected to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (the "UDHR") on the basis that in part it was not compatible with
Sharia. David Littman, Universal Human Rights and "Human Rights in
Islam," MIDSTREAM, Feb.-Mar. 1999, at 2, available at http://
www.dhimmitude.org/archive/universal_islam.html. The Cairo Declaration was
adopted in response to such concerns. Id.
28. Cairo Declaration, supra note 26, art. 5(a).
29. CFH 2401195 Nahmani V. Nahmani, [1996] lsrSC 50(4) 661 (opinion of
Dorner,
J.)
(English
translation
available
at
http://elyon1.court.gov.illFiles_ENG/95/010/0241z01l9502401O.z01.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 1,2008»; Evans V. United Kingdom, 6339/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2007).
30. To be sure, the right to bear children is not an unfettered one. Some
courts have held that the state may limit a person's ability to reproduce in
certain circumstances such as imprisonment or flagrant
toward child
support obligations. See, e.g., Gerber V. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002)
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Some of the fertility-preserving methods employed by the
Oncofertility Project rely on scientific advances allowing for
gametes to develop in vitro, rather than in ViVO. 31 These
methods raise the question whether in vitro reproduction
enjoys the same status as its much-older counterpart. While
significant social and moral issues with respect to assisted
reproductive technologies ("ART") arise,32 current case law
and state statutes suggest that the constitutional protection
of reproductive decision-making extends to individuals' use of
these techniques in order to conceive.
Would it be constitutional for a state to ban or severely
restrict the use of ART? Although no court rulings explicitly
recognize constitutional protection of a right to assisted
reproduction, a review of court cases, statutes, and academic
literature provides convincing evidence that U.s. law takes
for granted that such a right exists. First, many state
statutes recognize the legality of ART and support citizens'
(en bane) (holding that prison inmates lose their right to reproduce); State v.
Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) (upholding a condition of probation
requiring a "dead beat" to avoid having another child).
Some states (e.g., China) have imposed a limitation on the number of
children individuals may have. Matt Rosenberg, China's One Child Policy: One
Child Policy in China Designed to Limit Population Growth, ABOUT.COM, June
18, 2008, http://geography.about.comlodipopulationgeography/a/onechiId.htm
(last visited Dec. 21, 2008). However, such limitations are generally considered
to be gross violations of human rights. For instance, a fear of forced abortion in
China is grounds for an application for asylum in the United States. See Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIA"), 8 U.S.C. §
1l01(a)(42)(B) (2006) ("For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a
person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a
procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall
be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person
who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a
procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall
be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political
opinion.").
31. In vitro (literally, "within the glass") refers to performing a given
experiment in a controlled environment outside of a living organism. See
THOMAS L. STEDMAN, STEDl\1AN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 996 (28th ed. Lippincott
Williams & Wilkins 2006). In vivo (literally, "within the living") refers to
experimentation performed inside a living organism. See id.
32. See ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: AN Al"THOLOGY (Helen
Bequaert Holmes ed., 1992); DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How
MONEY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006);
Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the
Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283
(2007).
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access to these services. For instance, an Illinois statute that
regulated abortion and other procedures on embryos explicitly
declared that "[n]othing in th[e statute] is intended to
prohibit the performance of in vitro fertilization."33 Louisiana
has adopted statutes regulating in vitro fertilization ("IVF"),34
and New Hampshire and Pennsylvania have statutes
governing the obligations of sperm donors for IVF procedures,
thus recognizing (at least implicitly) the right to use these
technologies. 35
The federal government also implicitly
recognizes the legality of IVF treatments. 3S In addition,
"fourteen states currently require some types of health
insurance plans to include coverage of certain infertility
services or to make such coverage available."37 Thus, while
no state explicitly protects a right to use IVF, both state and
federal government implicitly acknowledge that such a right
exists. These statutes also recognize, however, state and
federal power to regulate assisted reproduction, and it
remains unclear the extent to which the right to procreate
limits such regulation.
Second, court cases have similarly acknowledged a right
to use ART. Several courts both in the United States and
abroad have adjudicated disputes over ownership of fertilized
frozen embryos. While the various courts came to differing
conclusions, they all took the underlying right to access ART
as a given. For instance, in Davis v. Davis, Tennessee's
highest court implied-without explicitly holding-that the
right to procreate by the means of IVF is within the ambit of

33. 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 510/6 (West 2003).
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2008) ("A 'human embryo' for the purposes
of this Chapter is an in vitro fertilized human ovum ...."); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5102 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
35. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (LexisNexis 2001) ("In vitro
fertilization and preembryo transfer shall be performed in accordance with rules
adopted by the department of health and human services ...."); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) (requiring persons who provide
IVF treatment to file certain reports with the Department of Health of the
Commonwealth of
Id. § 3216(c) ("Nor shall anything in this
section be construed to condone or prohibit the performance of in vitro
fertilization and
transfer.").
36. Fertility Clinic
Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §
263a-1. (2006).
37. JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: AsSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 8 (2007), available at http://
vlww.americanprogress.orglissuesl2007/12/pdflfuture_choices_section1.pdf.
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the constitutional right to privacy.38
The New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted the same reasoning in J.B. v. M.B.39
The New York Court of Appeals, while not explicitly
endorsing Davis, advised parties to IVF to enter into
agreements on disposition of zygotes, thus treating ART as a
legal means of reproduction and perhaps taking for granted
its constitutional protection. 40
At the same time, some courts have placed limits on
individuals' right to use ART. In In re Baby M, for example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court voided as against public
policy a surrogacy contract between the Sterns and the birth
mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, when she decided to keep the
babyY Thus, while the court implicitly acknowledged Mr.
Stern's right to use IVF, it held that the constitutional right
to reproduce did not encompass state enforcement of
surrogacy contracts.42 Nor have courts held that the right to
use ART includes a claim for state assistance to pay for these
services. Louisiana and Nevada explicitly exempt health
insurance plans from having to cover IVF in statutes that
mandate coverage for other reproductive health services, and
many states do not provide infertility treatment in their
public medical assistance programs. 43 These limits on the
right to access ART fit within the current U.S. Supreme
Court interpretations of reproductive liberty as a negative
right against state interference. 44 In other words, while
states are free to mandate insurance coverage of ART, the
Constitution does not require it.
38. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,600 (Tenn. 1992).
39. See J.B. v M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715-16 (N.J. 2001).
40. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); see also In re
Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d
261 (Wash. 2002); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
41. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-47 (N.J. 1988).
42. See id. John Robertson argued that procreative liberty includes a
constitutional right to state enforcement of surrogacy agreements. ROBERTSON,
supra note 14, at 131-32. For a critique of Robertson's position, see Dorothy E.
Roberts, Social Justice, Procreative Liberty and the Limits of Liberal Theory:
Robertson's Children of Choice, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1005 (1995) (book review).
43. See ARONS, supra note 37, at 8-10.
44. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 231. Two federal appellate courts have
rejected the claim that health plans that exclude infertility treatments violate
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
ARONS, supra note 37, at 12-13 (citing Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Cent., 95
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir.
2003)) .

.....
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Although the right to access ART, if one can afford it, is
accepted by legislatures and courts, women's use of these
technologies remains controversiaL On the one hand, some
scholars see access to assisted reproduction as extending
women's reproductive liberty. 45
Technologies that help
women have children enhance the choices they have to fulfill
their reproductive desires. In the context of oncofertility, it
can also be argued that techniques that restore fertility to
female cancer survivors place women on equal footing as men,
who are easily able to store semen for future use.
Oncofertility can be viewed as a gender equalizer that gives
women and girls the same reproductive options as men and
boys. On the other hand, feminists have long questioned the
gendered forces that lead many women to use ART. 46 They
point out that women's desire to bear children is influenced
by the stigma of infertility and the expectation that all
women will become mothers. 47 Added to this is the desire to
have a genetically related child. Some women feel a duty to
undergo the expense and physical trauma entailed in IVF,
rather than remaining childless or adopting a child, in order
to be acceptable to a male partner and the wider society.
Girls whose ovaries have been preserved may feel added
pressure to become mothers because of the effort and expense
that went into the procedure. Although many believe that
access to ART is essential to reproductive freedom, others see
it as reinforcing unjust expectations about women's
reproductive roles.
This review of statutes and court decisions shows that
U.S. law currently acknowledges that procreative liberty
encompasses, subject to some degree of state and judicial
regulation, the right to use ART. Having established this, we
now proceed to the discussion of unsettled legal issues that
may affect the practice of oncofertility specialists, and thus
the treatment options given to patients.

45. See, e.g., REPRODUCTION, ETHICS AND THE LAW:
FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); ROBERTSON, supra note 14.
46. See JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOlVmS:
REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM (1993); BARBARA
KA'l'Z ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: ImWLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A
PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989).
47. See RAYMOND, supra note 46, at 5-6; ROTHMAN, supra note 46, at 29-33.
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B. What Are the Reproductive Rights ofMinors?
Generally speaking, minors have the same reproductive
rights as adults, except that states have greater power to
regulate the conduct of minors. In Bellotti v. Baird, the
Supreme Court held that a requirement of parental consent to
abortion, without a judicial bypass prOVISlOn, was
unconstitutionaL Although the Court subsequently has been
more solicitous of legislative attempts to interpose adult
involvement in the minor's abortion decisions,48 it has never
allowed any state to legislate a scheme under which a minor's
decision could be vetoed by a parent (unless such a "veto" is
also sustained by an impartial judge).49 Additionally, most
states permit minors to use contraceptives without seeking
adult permission. 50
With respect to deciding to bear a child (as opposed to
deciding to terminate a pregnancy), minors' rights are even
broader. The age of consent in many states is well below the
age of majority (especially when both participants are
minors).51 No state permits any third party to require a
minor to get an abortion should the minor become pregnant.
In other words, if a minor decides to bear the child, the
decision is hers alone. Finally, as discussed below, parents
cannot deprive minors of future reproductive capacity, absent
compelling need and a court order. 52 In short, a minor's
liberty to determine his or her own reproductive future is
48. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899
(1992) (upholding parental notification requirement); Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 326 (2006) ("States unquestionably have the right to
require parental involvement when a minor considers terminating her
pregnancy, because of their 'strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of
[their] young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment
may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely.' » (quoting
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1990»).
49. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 ("[AJ State may require a minor seeking an
abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an
adequate judicial bypass procedure. ").
50. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & mST. CODE § 14503 (West 2001); 325 ILL. COMPo
STAT. A.N"N. lOll (West 2001); see also Carey V. Population Servs., Int'I., 431 U.S.
678 (1977) (overturning state statute prohibiting those under sixteen from
accessing contraception).
51. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16·6·3 (1994 & Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE A.'rx.
§ 97-3·65 (1972 & Supp. 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2008). All of these statutes define the age of consent for the purposes of
sexual relations, and all set it lower than eighteen.
52. See infra Part IV.B.
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constitutionally protected from restraint except in narrow
circumstances that are subject to judicial review. Minors
enjoy the same constitutional protection of their reproductive
rights as adults, even if exercising some of these rights (due
to the limitations of biology) is deferred until they mature.

III. WHAT ARE THE MEDICAL OPTIONS?
As medical advances are made in cancer therapies and as
the number of cancer survivors increases, 53 new challenges
arise beyond defeating cancer itself. One of these significant
challenges is the negative impact that cancer treatments may
often have on reproductive function in young adults and
children. Life-preserving treatments such as chemotherapy
and radiation threaten fertility, leading to immediate
infertility in some cases and subfertility in others, the latter
resulting in a lower sperm count in men and accelerated loss
of follicles in women. 54
Additionally, patients with
autoimmune disease are often treated with similar alkylating
chemotherapy that can affect their fertility.55 In an attempt
to meet the urgent needs of these patients, the new field of
oncofertility has been created to unifY two essential
disciplines-oncology and fertility-and to explore more
fertility-sparing treatments, as well as expand on current
assisted reproductive technologies focused on these patients.
There are currently a handful of options available to
newly diagnosed cancer patients, including more traditional
options as well as novel assisted reproductive technologies.
The traditional options include both third-party reproduction
and adoption. Third-party reproduction consists of gamete
donation and/or uterine surrogacy for cancer patients whose
therapies diminished these functions.
Domestic and
international adoptions are additional alternatives, though a
53. See Ahmedin Jemal et al., Cancer Statistics, 2007, 57 CA CANCER J.
CLIN. 43, 48 (2007) (noting decrease in cancer death rates); Murat Sonmezer &
Kutluk Oktay, Fertility Preservation in Female Patients, 10 HUM. REPROD.
UPDATE 251, 251 (2004).
54. See Sonmezer & Oktay, supra note 53, at 252; Robert E. Brannigan,
Fertility Preservation in Adult Male Cancer Patients, in ONCOFERTILITY:
FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SURVIVORS, supra note 3, at 28-42.
55. See G.E. Katsifis & A.G. Tzioufas, Ovarian Failure in Systemic Lupus
Erythematosus Patients Treated with Pulsed Intravenous Cyclophosphamide, 13
LUPUS 673, 673 (2004) (noting ovarian failure as a side-effect of lupus
treatment); Sonmezer & Oktay, supra note 53, at 254.
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patient's cancer diagnosis might be a hindrance to a
successful adoption. 56 These options are valuable means of
forming a family, yet they fail to fulfill the desire of many
women to reproduce genetically related offspring.
In response to its high demand, ART has progressed
tremendously over the last three decades, providing new ways
of conserving fertility. For men and pubertal boys, feasible
options for fertility preservation already exist. One such
option is semen cryopreservation, where semen samples are
provided by patients and frozen for later use. Intrauterine
insemination and/or intracystoplasmic sperm injection
("ICSI") can then be used to conceive with relatively high
success rates-one sperm alone may be sufficient to fertilize
an oocyte and result in pregnancy.57 If the cancer patient is
unable to obtain a semen sample via ejaculatory methods, a
surgical biopsy can be performed and mature sperm procured
from the sample. 58 These options for men and pubertal boys
can be provided immediately, permitting the patient to return
to treatment soon thereafter. Options for prepubertal boys
are on the horizon, and will require a testis biopsy and
storage of the biopsied tissue for later use. 59 Because sperm
represent a ready source of mature gametes that are
available in large numbers and can be cryopreserved easily,
the primary concern of a male patient is to be navigated to an
appropriate sperm bank in a timely manner.
For women facing a cancer diagnosis, various fertility
preserving procedures are also available, though they are
more limited than those mentioned for men. Currently, the
most well-established option is to undergo ovarian
stimulation for maturation and retrieval of the eggs. 60 The
eggs may be fertilized by selected sperm donors or
cryopreserved. In both cases, the individual must delay
cancer treatment during the time of hormonal induction.
56. See Allison Rosen, Third-Party Reproduction and Adoption in Cancer
Patients, 34 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. MONOGRAPHS 91, 92 (2005) (noting barriers
faced by cancer patients and survivors in both domestic and international
adoption).
57. Brannigan, supra note 53, at 42.
58. ld.
59. ld. at 45.
60. Sanjay K. Agarwal & R. Jeffrey Chang, Fertility Management for Women
with Cancer, in ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER
SURVIVORS, supra note 3, at 15, 20.
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Neither pubertal nor prepubertal girls are eligible for
ovulatory induction procedures. An additional developing
technology is ovarian tissue cryopreservation, where cortical
tissue strips are obtained and reimplanted at the time of
remission. 61 Because ovarian follicles are present in the
ovary of women from the time of birth, 62 ovarian tissue can be
recovered from prepubertal, pubertal, and adult women. The
number of follicles diminishes rapidly with age;63 thus, tissue
cryopreservation is more amenable to younger patients. For
female patients undergoing radiation, surgical ovarian
transposition can be done prior to therapy to remove the
ovaries from the field of impact. 64
Although these technologies exist for women, they have
significant limitations that exist beyond mere research
obstacles. Many of the techniques that are most frequently
utilized, including embryo and oocyte cryopreservation
require hormonal stimulation for oocyte retrieval. This is
inevitably problematic for several reasons. First, cancer
treatment must be delayed when undergoing any of these
stimulation-dependent procedures. In many cases, however,
it is imperative that a patient begin treatment immediately
after a cancer diagnosis, and the option of withholding
treatment for an extended period of time is simply
nonexistent.
Another major concern regarding ovarian
stimulation is the reaction it might elicit from hormonally
responsive cancers, including certain types of breast and
ovarian cancers.65 A third limitation of these therapies is that
hormonal stimulation is only permitted for young women,
excluding girls younger than eighteen-years-old. As a result,
this cohort of cancer patients has limited options available to
them. An additional limitation of embryo cryopreservation is
the need for sperm, requiring either a partner or use of a
sperm donor. Furthermore, tissue transplantation carries a
theoretical and potentially real-depending on the cancer

61. Id. at 22.
62. Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions:
Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 270 (1999).
63. See ARTHUR C. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 899 (8th
ed.1991).
64. Sonmezer & Oktay, supra note 53, at 258.
65. Id. at 253.
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concern of seeding metastatic disease. 66
In the quest to meet the urgent needs of many cancer
patients facing fertility-threatening treatment, the field of
oncofertility has set out to find novel methods to improve the
awareness of providers and the public, develop rapid response
systems and easy navigation tools, and, finally, to develop
new modalities that will preserve fertility at the time of
diagnosis. Significant progress has been made in each of
these areas. One of the most important aspects of the work is
the development of in vitro follicle maturation, which is
envisioned to provide utility to tissue that is cryopreserved at
the time of cancer diagnosis and which will not incur the
downstream risk of the reintroduction of cancer. This
technique utilizes cryopreserved ovarian tissue to recover
immature follicles, which can be grown to produce mature
oocytes available for IVF. While in vitro follicle maturation is
still experimental, it has resulted in successful animal births
and is currently being explored in human tissue. 67 If
successful in humans, in vitro follicle maturation could
become a new alternative for young patients-including
prepubertal girls-for whom hormonal stimulation and
embryo production is not an option.
Amid the hope and opportunities that scientific success of
in vitro follicle maturation could bring, many legal and
ethical implications of this new technology will arise. First,
one must consider the implications of ovarian tissue removal,
and the significance of removing an organ. Guidelines and
laws will have to be created in order to clarify the value and
ownership of such tissue and the legal limits of acquisition
and disposition in adults and minors. This is especially
important in a setting where the death of a patient is a
significant possibility, and where ownership of the deceased's
tissue may therefore be contested. Additional precautions
will need to be taken owing to the nature of this tissue, which
is not merely a body part, but one that holds the potential of
producing offspring, highlighting the heavy consequences this
66. [d. at 258.
67. See Evelyn E. Telfer et al., A Two-Step Serum-Free Culture System
Supports Development of Human Oocytes from Primordial Follicles in the
Presence of Activin, 23 HUM. REPROD. 1151, 1155 (2008) (reporting success of
growing human follicles from cortical strips); Min Xu et aL, Tissue-Engineered
Follicles Produce Live, Fertile Offspring, 12 TISSUE ENGINEERING 2739 (2006).
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type of research could have. This article provides a means of
initiating discussion and an opportunity to create much
needed social, moral, and legal guidelines that should
accompany this area of research.
IV. THE LEGAL & MORAL QUESTIONS

A. Who Can Consent to a Medical Procedure and What Are
the Limits?
As with any other medical procedure, the patient must
freely and voluntarily consent to the ovarian tissue
cryopreservation in order for that protocol to be legally68 (and
morally)69 employed.
Any medical manipulation of the
patient without such consent, under our laws and traditions,
constitutes battery (even if medically beneficial to the
patient). 70
Generally speaking, a competent adult can consent to
almost any legal medical procedure,71 including one that will
permanently alter his or her reproductive capacities. 72 Thus,
adults are free to consent to tubal ligation or vasectomies,73
even though these procedures are most often irreversible, 74
68. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It is clear and
appellees concede that . . . the hospital authorities would have no right to
impose compulsory medical treatment against the patient's will and indeed, to
do so would constitute a common law assault and battery.").
69. See Gregory Dolin, A Healer or an Executioner? The Proper Role of a
Psychiatrist in a Criminal Justice System, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 205-07 (2002)
(arguing that patients' consent is sine qua non of ethical medical practice).
70. See Winters, 446 F.2d at 68.
71. See Sehloendorff v. Soe'y of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
(opinion by Cardozo, J.) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body ....").
72. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2974 (2005) ("It shall be lawful for any
physician licensed by the Board of Medicine to perform a vasectomy,
salpingectomy, or other surgical sexual sterilization procedure on any person
eighteen years of age or older, who has the capacity to give informed consent,
when so requested in writing by such person."); GA. CODE ANN. § 31·20·2 (1994)
("It shall be lawful for any physician to perform a sterilization procedure upon a
person 18 years of age or over, or less than 18 years of age if legally married,
provided that a request in writing is made by such person and provided, further,
that prior to or at the time of such request a full and reasonable medical
explanation is given by such physician to such person as to the meaning and
consequence of such operation.").
73. See supra note 72.
74. See WILLIAM GANONG, The Gonads: Development & Function of the
Reproductive System, in REVIEW OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 411, 428 (22d ed. The
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and thus will permanently limit reproductive capacity ot the
patient. Conversely, as discussed below, competent adults
can consent to procedures that will preserve or enhance their
reproductive capacities. Thus, when the oncofertility patient
is a competent adult, she can legally and ethically decide for
herself whether or not she wants to undergo an invasive
procedure in hopes of preserving future reproductive
capacity.75
Consent, while a sine qua non of ethical medical practice,
is not the only consideration. The first principle of medicine
is "first, do no harm."76 In other words, the physician ought
not perform procedures or prescribe treatment that carries
risks, but no identifiable benefits.77 This does not mean that
experimental treatments are out ofbounds,78 but, rather, that
prior to asking for the patient's consent, physicians must
assure themselves that the treatment offered carries more
potential medical benefits than harms. 79
With respect to minors, the question of consent becomes
more complicated. In most circumstances, parents (or legal
McGraw-Hill Companies 2005); Cecilia K. Wieslander et aL, Therapeutic
Gynecologic Procedures, in CURRENT DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT: OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 796, 804 (Alan H. DeCherney et aL eds., 10th ed. 2007).
75. 'I'o be sure, such a decision may not be an uncomplicated (or even, in
some cases, a completely rational) one. The patient will most likely be under
tremendous stress from the just-received, difficult diagnosis, and will likely be
focused mostly on preserving her life first and foremost, rather than on a
somewhat ancillary issue of fertility preservation. Yet, despite the difficulty of
the choice, as a legal matter, and as an ethical matter, the choice rests with the
patient as an autonomous being, with her own human dignity.
76. The Hippocratic Oath-Classical Version, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh!
novaldoctorsloath3lassical.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2008) ("I will apply
dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and
judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.").
77. Linda Farber Post, Unblinded Mandatory HN Screening of Newborns:
Care or Coercion? 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 169, 203 n.211 (1994) ("Following the
axiom 'first do no harm,' public health and preventive medicine experts
generally consider that preventive interventions should be of proven efficacy
and effectiveness.").
78. See Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy
Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL'y 1051, 1070 (2007)
("Physicians value safety higher than effectiveness: in their perspective, futile
treatments can be scrapped and supplanted in a trial-and-error effort ....").
79. An experimental treatment carries a potential medical benefit in a sense
that there are sound scientific bases to believe that it may work. It is then the
patient's job to assign relative weight to the potential benefits as well as
potential harm that may result from treatment. See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 69,
at 204-05.
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guardians) are invested with legal authority to make medical
decisions for their minor offspring and generally can choose
when, whether, and from whom to seek care for their minor
children. 80 This discretion is given to parents for good reason.
As the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research observed:
[A] family member ought usually to be designated as
surrogate to make health care decisions for an
incapacitated patient in consultation with the physician
and other health care professionals:
(1) The family is generally most concerned about the
good of the patient.

(2) The family will also usually be most
knowledgeable about the patient's goals, preferences,
and values.
(3) The family deserves recognition as an important
social unit that ought to be treated, within limits, as
a responsible decisionmaker in matters that
intimately affect its members.
(4) Especially in a society in which many other
traditional forms of community have eroded,
participation in a family is often an important
dimension of personal fulfillment.
(5) Since a protected sphere of privacy and autonomy
is required for the flourishing of this interpersonal
union, institutions and the state should be reluctant
to intrude, particularly regarding matters that are
personal and on which there is-. [sic] a wide range of
opinion in society.81
80. See, e.g., In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (N.Y. 1979) ("[G]reat
deference must be accorded a parent's choice as to the mode of medical
treatment to be undertaken and the physician selected to administer the
same."). There are exceptions to this rule. See infra notes 84-85. Parents
cannot refuse
treatments such as blood transfusions, and may not
deprive their children of medical attention when such deprivation is
tantamount to child abuse. See infra notes 84-85. However, with respect to
routine procedures, the choice lies with the parents. See Hofbauer, 393 N.E. 2d
at 1014 (holding that after consulting with trained physicians, parents can
choose whatever course of action any accredited provider recommends).
81. MORRIS B. ABRAM ET AL., PRESIDENTS COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING
TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL,
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The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
similarly notes that "family members and loved ones" are
usually "in a position to know best the patient's wishes."82 In
addition to these moral and ethical observations, American
courts have held that parents have a constitutional right to
bring up children as they deem best without interference by
the state, absent a compelling state interest to the contrary.83
The parent's right to decide on a child's treatment is not
absolute. Unlike a competent adult who can choose to reject
any treatment for any or no reason, a parent cannot reject a
medically necessary treatment on behalf of his child.
Parental decisions regarding medical treatment are limited
by the principle that parents must act in the best interest of
the child. 84 Thus, for instance, a parent may not decline a
blood transfusion on behalf of his child, even if both the child
and the parent hold religious views that prohibit blood
transfusions. 85 Similarly, parents cannot consent to enroll a
MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 127-28 (1983).
82. U. S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS
DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 1 (4th ed. 2001),
http://www.usccb.orgibishops/directives.shtml.
83. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that parents
have a constitutional right to deny visitation opportunities to third parties);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that parents have a right to
decline to educate their children past eighth grade when such compulsory
education conflicts with parental religious beliefs); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that a state cannot prevent parents from sending their
children to parochial schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding
that the parents have a constitutional right to teach their children a foreign
language).
84. See, e.g., In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1987) (" 'Several
relevant factors must be taken into consideration before a state insists upon
medical treatment rejected by the parents.' . .. [Tlhe juvenile court is vested
with a 'very extensive discretion in determining what will be in the best
interests of a child ... .' ") (internal citations omitted); Newmark v. Williams,
588 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Del. 1990) ("This Court must therefore substitute its own
objective judgment to determine what is in Colin's 'best interests.' "); In re
Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1390 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) ("Douglas and Lori
Willmann may, under the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the state of Ohio, be free to deny themselves whatever medical
care they choose, but it does not, and cannot here, follow that they are free to
impose that denial upon David.").
85. Jehovah's Witnesses of Wash. v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488,
504 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (holding that parents have no constitutional right to
deny blood transfusion to minors); In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 414 (Mass.
1991) (affirming an order authorizing blood transfusion to treat leukemia
overall parental religious objections); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1119 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (affirming an order permitting blood transfusion to treat sickle
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child in clinical research "unless it is intended to promote the
health of the population represented by the potential subject,
[and] the research cannot instead be performed with
competent persons."86 Furthermore, parents are limited in
their ability to consent even to experimental treatment of the
minor by two considerations. "First, if the treatment is not
medically necessary for the minor, it must not be
unreasonably harmful. Second, the treatment must be to the
benefit of the minor, and not just to the benefit of the minor's
parents or other family members."87 These limitations are
not surprising if one keeps in mind the overarching
requirement that in deciding on the course of treatment,
parents must act in the child's best interest. 88
In addition to obtaining parental consent, it is often
useful to seek the child's input into the treatment decision.
First, such input may carry legal weight. 89 Second,
[sleeking the assent of a minor who is not legally
authorized to consent demonstrates respect for the
decision-making skills of a nonautonomous individual to
the extent that he or she is able to participate in the
decision. This is particularly relevant for adolescents who
cell anemia over parental religious objections).
86. WORLD MED. ASS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH
INVOLVING
HUMAN
SUBJECTS
4
'II 27 (1964), available at
http://www.wma.netie/policy/pdfl17c.pdf.
87. Kishka-Kamari Ford, "First, Do No Harm"-The Fiction of Legal
Parental Consent to Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19
YALE L. & POL'y REV. 469, 481 (2001); see also Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121,
123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (holding that procedures done on the minor even with
parental consent constitute battery if not done for the benefit of the minor
child).
88. When there is room for a legitimate difference of opinion as to which
treatment is best, the state defers to the parental choice. See, e.g., Hofbauer,
393 N.E.2d at 1014 (holding that parents may choose any treatment that has
been "recommended by their physician and which has not been totally rejected
by all responsible medical authority"). Parents are, however, precluded from
choosing a treatment that has no identifiable benefits to the minor. See supra
note 87 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1990) (holding that the minor
can refuse blood transfusions); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990)
(" '[AJ minor acquires capacity to consent to different kinds of invasions and
conduct at different stages of his development.' ") (internal citations omitted);
Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 836 (W. Va. 1992)
(holding that unemancipated minors may nonetheless be legally able to consent
to procedures depending" 'upon the age, ability, experience, education, training,
and degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor' " (quoting Cardwell
v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748 (Tenn. 1987))).
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are cognitively mature but below the age of legal majority
and still dependent upon adults for their basic health care
decisions. 90

Third, seeking minor's assent may be a prerequisite to
administering the treatment effectively because it ensures
that the patient is compliant. 91
Thus, when dealing with pediatric patients the simple
formula of " 'efficacy of treatment' plus 'patient's consent'
equals 'administering the treatment' " does not hold. In
pediatric cases, in addition to assuring themselves of the
treatment's benefits, physicians must also make sure that
they seek parental consent, and the child's assent (where
practicable). These considerations ultimately are subject to a
judicial determination of the best interests of the child. 92
B. Are There Limitations to Proxy Consent in the
Reproductive Context?
As the above discussion demonstrates, although parents
are generally permitted to make medical decisions for their
minor children, these decisions must be in the best interests
of the child. 93 In the area of sexual health and reproduction,
parents' decisional rights are further limited. For instance,
courts have held on numerous occasions that parents cannot
veto a minor's decision to seek an abortion. 94 Numerous
90. Soc'y for Adolescent Med., Confidential Healthcare for Adolescents:
Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 21 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 408, 409 (1997); see also Am. Acad. Pediatrics, Comm. on Bioethics,
Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95
PEDIATRICS 314, 316 (1995) ("There are clinical situations in which a persistent
refusal to assent (i.e., dissent) may be ethically binding.").
91. Cf. Emmanuel Jaunay et a!., Treatment Refusal in Adolescents with
Severe Chronic Illness and Borderline Personality Disorder, 15 J. CAN. ACAD.
CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 135, 136 (2006) (discussing how a number of
factors, including "poor parent-child communication and a strained relationship
with the treating physician," increase non-compliance with treatment).
92. Doctors of course caunot unilaterally decide to ignore the wishes of the
parents and determine for themselves what is in the child's "best interests." To
the extent that there are disagreements between the physicians and the
parents, such disagreements are resolved by the courts. See, e.g., In re
Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1011 (allowing parents to, after court review, choose
treatment for their child against the primary doctor's recommendations); cf In
re Eric B., 189235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1987) (noting that it is the "state,"
rather than a doctor, that has an interest in child's well being and therefore can
act to protect those interests).
93. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
510 U.S. 1309 (1992);
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states have also enacted legislation that allows a minor to
seek treatment (or preventative measures) for pregnancy95
and sexually transmitted disease without parental
involvement or consent.96 There are weighty reasons why
reproductive decisions are excluded from otherwise nearly
plenary parental authority to make medical decisions on
behalf of their offspring. First, because decisions that affect
the reproductive capacities of minors necessarily interfere
with "one of the basic civil rights of man,"97 they must be
heavily scrutinized and sometimes disregarded. Second, it
may be more likely that parental involvement in a minor's
decisions on such sensitive issues as sexual activity and
pregnancy will not serve a minor's best interest. 98
In exploring the limits of parental authority over
reproductive and sexual health decisions of minors, it is
useful to look at the jurisprudence governing four
procedures-male circumcision, female genital cutting, sex
assignment surgery, and sterilization. All four are elective
procedures,99 but all are not treated in the same way by the
legal system. Looking at the differences in the leeway
permitted to parents in each of those circumstances, and the
underlying reasons for those differences, can help in
constructing a framework within which questions about the
legal treatment of oncofertility can be answered.
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (CaL 1997); N. Fla. Women's
Health & Counseling Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003); Planned
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Attorney
677 N.E.2d 101 (Mass.
1997).
95. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The
Ethics of Pediatric Research,
57 DUKE L.J. 517, 547 n.118 (2007).
96. Id.
97. See Skinner v. Okl. ex reI. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
98. See Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile
Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1300
(2004) ("In cases where parents hold strong views on subjects such as abortion,
minors, especially those dependent on parental support, are influenced by their
parents' wishes, even when those wishes may not be in the minors' best
interest.") .
99. See Melissa W. Kaufman et al., Neonatal Circumcision: Benefits, Risks,
and Family Teaching, 26 AM. J. MATERN. CHILD NURS. 197, 197 (2001) (stating
that reasons for circumcision are often "religious, cultural, . . . or parental
choice"). In some cases, male circumcision may be medically necessary, but
those constitute a minority of all circumcisions performed in this country. Id. at
197-99 (noting that
percent of all males in the United States are
circumcised at birth, and that only 0.6% of all boys suffer from phimosis
(inability of foreskin to retract)).
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Male Circumcision
Male circumcision involves removal of the foreskin of the
penis. 100 It is a procedure usually performed on a newborn
child,101 sometimes for religious or cultural reasons. 102
Following World War II, the practice of circumcision became
quite common in the United States. 103 Parents routinely
consent to the procedure and it is routinely performed. 104
Lately, however, the practice started drawing criticism as
being incompatible with the child's right to bodily integrity
and autonomy.105
In 1999, the American Academy of
Pediatrics 106 issued its position statement on circumcision,
recommending that doctors should not routinely advise
parents to seek circumcision of their sons, but should, at the
same time, yield to parental request for the surgery. 107
Despite the increased criticism, male circumcision remains
legal.
For instance, in a 2008 case involving a dispute between
divorced parents over the decision to circumcise a minor male
child, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the custodial
parent has legal authority "to make medical decisions for his
or her child, including decisions involving elective procedures
and decisions that may involve medical risks."108 The court
explicitly noted that "although circumcision is an invasive
medical procedure that results in permanent physical
alteration of a body part and has attendant medical risks, the
decision to have a male child circumcised for medical or
1.

100. Id. at 197.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Joel C. Hutcheson, Male Neonatal Circumcision: Indications,
Controversies and Complications, 31 UROLOGIC CLINICS N. AM. 461,461 (2004).
104. See id.
105. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Circumcision: Cultural-Legal Analysis, 9 VA. J.
SOC. POL'y & L. 497, 551-80 (2002) (discussing the "anti-circumcision
movement"); see also Adam Liptak, Opponents of Circumcision Use the Legal
System and Legislatures to Combat It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,2003, at A14.
106. American Academy of Pediatrics is "an organization of 60,000
pediatricians committed to the attainment of optimal physical, mental, and
social health and well-being for all infants, children, adolescents, and young
adults." Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, About AAP, http://www.aap.org/about.html
(last visited Dec. 21, 2008).
107. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Circumcision Policy Statement, 103 PEDIATRICS
686,
686
(2003),
available
at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgilcontentlabstractl103/3/686.
108. In re Marriage of Boldt, 176 P.3d 388, 393 (Or. 2008) (emphasis added).
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religious reasons is one that is commonly and historically
made by parents in the United States."109 The court did limit
parental authority somewhat by directing the trial court to
examine the views of the minor (twelve-years-old at the time)
and take them into account.ll0
In State v. Baxter,l11 the Washington Court of Appeals
noted that "ritual circumcisions . . . have been performed for
thousands of years and have never been held contrary to
public policy."112 Courts in other states, in addressing various
claims of medical malpractice and improper informed consent
for the circumcision procedure, have uniformly assumed that
a properly performed circumcision after a proper informed
consent by one of the parents is fully consistent with the
lawY3
2.

Female Genital Cutting

By contrast, consider a procedure performed on minor
females commonly referred to as "female circumcision" or
"female genital cutting," which involves "partial or total
removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the
female genital organs for non-medical reasons."114 Like male
circumcision it may be performed for religious or cultural
reasons, and like male circumcision it is "an ancient cultural
or social custom."1l5 Unlike male circumcision, however,
female genital cutting is universally viewed (in the American
legal system) as a procedure to which parents cannot legally
consent.
For instance, in 1996, Congress passed the
Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act, which
makes it a crime to perform the procedure on a minor.n e In
109. Id. at 394.
110. Id.

111. State v. Baxter, 141 P.3d 92 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
112. Id. at 98
added).
113. See, e.g., Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, 895 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1995)
(assuming, in context of malpractice action, that a properly consented
circumcision is permissible); Wilson v. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986); Flatt v. Kantak, 687 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 2004).
114. World
Health
Org.,
Female
Genital
Mutilation,
http://www.who.intitopics/female_genitaLmutilation/en/ (last visited Dec. 21,
2008) (emphasis added).
115. People v. Sanchez, 800 N.E.2d 455, 462 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
116. Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 116
(2000). The statute provides that (subject to certain medical necessity
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enacting the statute, Congress found that "the practice of
female genital mutilation often results in the occurrence of
physical and psychological health effects that harm the
women involved."l17
This fmding is supported by the
statement of the World Health Organization on this issue.1l8
A number of states have enacted similar prohibitions of the
practice. 119
Thus, unlike male circumcision, which
generally considered to be a safe procedure with some
possible medical benefits,120 the female genital cutting is
viewed in this country as both non-beneficial and harmful. 121

3. Sex Assignment Surgery
A third case of elective sexual surgery is sex assignment
surgery performed on minors. Studies show that nearly one
out of every two-thousand children born in the United States
is born with ambiguous genitalia. 122 An estimated one to two
hundred pediatric sex assignment surgeries are performed
each year. 123 The sexual assignment surgeries for children
with ambiguous genitalia became an accepted standard of
care in the 1970s.124 Most of these children underwent
surgeries to create external female genitalia,125 and were
exceptions) "whoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or
any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person who
has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 5 years, or both." ld. Note, however, that an adult can consent
to this procedure for herself. This is in line with the general rule that an adult
can consent to virtually any legal medical treatment or procedure. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
117. Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 645, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006».
118. See supra note 114.
119. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.4 (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 780 (2008); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/12-34 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., HEALT-GEN.
§ 20-601 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2245 (West 2003); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.85 (McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-36-01 (1997);
R.L GEN. LAws § 11-5-2(c)(3) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-110 (2002); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 146.35 (West 2006).
120. See Kaufman, supra note 99, at 197.
121. See supra notes 117-18.
122. Kenneth Kipnis & Milton Diamond, Pediatric Ethics and the Surgical
Assignment of Sex, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 398, 401 (1998).
123. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical
Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with
Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 17 (2000).
124. ld. at 3.
125. External female genitalia are easier to fashion than external male
ld.
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raised as girls.126 Since the surgeries were performed on
minor children, parents were the ones consenting to the
procedure. Although there have been no definitive court
decisions, in 1996 the American Academy of Pediatrics
supported the idea of elective sex assignment surgery and
recommended that it occur before the age of two-and-a-half
years. 127
In the last decade, serious concerns have been raised
about the efficacy of the sex assignment surgeries and the
consequences such surgeries have on the patients. 128 For
instance, cases have been reported where the children who
had sex-assignment surgery grew up unhappy with and
confused about their assigned gender, and with psychological
problems stemming from these feelings. 129 The discovery of
these harms, and the realization that sex-assignment surgery
forecloses the "[c]hild's [r]ight to an [o]pen [f]uture,"130 has led
some experts and advocates to question the morality of
parents consenting to sex-assignment surgery without any
input by the children themselves. l31 Nonetheless, the current
standard of practice in the medical profession is to permit,
and even to encourage, parents to quickly decide whether to
assign a specific sex to a child with ambiguous genitalia. 132 In
the absence of statutes or court decisions to the contrary, this
remains a legal practice, even though it permanently
determines a child's sexual identity and the way the child will
lead his or her life. 133

4. Sterilization
A final case to consider

IS

the parental decision to

126. Id.
127. AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, Timing ofElective Surgery on the Genitalia of
Male Children with Particular Reference to the Risks, Benefits, and
Psychological Effects of Surgery and Anesthesia, 97 PEDIATRICS 590, 590 (1996),
available at http://aappolicy.aappublications.orglcgilreprintlpediatrics; 97/41
590.pdf.
128. Beh & Diamond, supra note 123, at 23-27.
129. See id. at 6-7.
130. Id. at 57.
131. See id. at 34.
132. See id. at 43-44.
133. To be sure, once grOVlll, the child can attempt to reverse the surgery.
But even if successful in that attempt, the prior surgery has still permanently
affected the way the child grew up, learned to socialize, and developed
relationships. See id. at 11.
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sterilize a child. Some parents wish to sterilize a daughter
who is severely developmentally or mentally disabled because
they believe that child bearing is not in the daughter's best
interest, in part because she is unlikely to be able to care for
her child, or perhaps even to understand the nature of
pregnancy and childbirth. 134 Nonetheless, in most states,
parents cannot make this decision on their own, even if the
medical professionals agree with and recommend this course
of action.135 Instead, most states require an independent
judicial determination of the best interest of the child sought
to be sterilized. 136 The courts and legislatures have viewed
sterilization "as an extraordinary measure which is to be
decided by a court and undertaken only pursuant to court
order."137 That is so because "[c]onsent by parents to the
sterilization of their mentally retarded offspring has a history
of abuse which indicates that parents, at least in this limited
context, cannot be presumed to have an identity of interest
with their children."138 Generally, courts also require that
there be "clear and convincing evidence"139-a very high
standard14°-showing that sterilization is in the child's best
134. See In re AW., 637 P.2d 366, 367-68 (Colo. 1981) (discussing the
reasons advanced by parents in their petition to sterilize their "severely
retarded" twelve-year-old daughter).
135. See Kathleen M. Boozang, CAM for Kids, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'y
109, 123 (2001) ("tAJ court order is typically obtained before an incompetent
minor is sterilized . . . ."); Christine Muckle, Comment,
a Voice to
Intersex Individuals through Hospital Ethics Committees, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
987, 1000-01 (2006) ("[11n some situations-such as parental decisions
regarding sterilization, organ donation, and persistent vegetative state ("PVS")
conditions-courts have questioned the parent's ability to competently consent
because of the inherent gravity of the situation and the possibility of a conflict
of interest between the parent and the child. In these situations, it is not
necessarily that the parents are prohibited from making health care decisions
for their children, only that competency is not assumed. Thus, parents are not
given the same level of deference that they would normally receive.").
136. See supra note 135.
137. Mich. Protection & Advocacy Servo v. Kirkendall, 841 F. Supp. 796, 801
(E.D. Mich. 1993).
138. In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 370 (footnotes and citations omitted).
139. See, e.g., Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hosp., Inc., 447 A2d 1244,
1254 (Md. 1982); In re Terwilliger, 450 A2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); In
re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635,640 (Wash. 1980).
140. See Bryant M. Bennett, Comment, Evidence: Clear and Convincing
Proof' Appellate Review, 32 CAL. L. REV. 74, 75 (1944) ("Where clear and
convincing proof is required, the proponent must convince the jury or judge, as
the case may be, that it is highly probable that the facts which he asserts are
true.").
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interests and that it is the least intrusive method of
controlling the child's reproduction. 141

5. Variations in Parental Consent Requirements
A common thread runs through the four situations just
reviewed. It appears that the parental right to consent to
surgery involving reproductive or sexual organs is highest
when the procedure has identifiable (even if controversial)
medical benefit and does not threaten the health or future
reproductive choices of the child. Additionally, historical
traditions as well as contemporary cultural and professional
value judgments play a significant role in the acceptance or
rejection of these procedures. Thus, parents are given
virtually unfettered authority to consent to male circumcision
because there are identifiable142 (though hotly debated) 143
medical benefits to the procedure and because the procedure
has been part of the Western tradition for close to 5000
years. 144 Similarly, parents can consent to sex assignment
surgery because the mainstream medical profession believes
this surgery is necessary for a child's normal psychological
and emotional development,145 despite contradictory evidence
from recent studies. 146 This perceived medical benefit is tied
to dominant U.S. social norms which dictate that individuals
must have unambiguous external genitalia and sexual
identities.147
On the opposite side of the legal spectrum, female genital
cutting is considered to offer no medical benefit of any kind, 148
is foreign to Western traditions,149 and carries a high medical
141. See In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 806 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
142. See Kaufman, supra note 99, at 198-99.
143. Id.
144. Miller, supra note 105, at 512.
145. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 123, at 40 (noting that sex assignment
surgeries are viewed as beneficial by the medical community and as a result
have not drawn much judicial scrutiny).
146. Id. at 23-27.
147. See generally Alissa Quart, When Girls Will Be Boys, N.Y. TIMES, March
16, 2008, at MM32 (discussing difficulties faced by transgender individuals in
terms of societal acceptance); Deborah Young, On the Frontier of Transgender
Civil Rights, TIMES·PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 20, 2008 at DIB.
148. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
149. See Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to
the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant
Children?: The Practice of Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 113 (1999) ("Unlike male circumcision, the practice
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risk to the subject.150 Thus, parents are flatly prohibited from
consenting to this procedure. The decision to sterilize an
incompetent girl lies somewhere in between. Although the
procedure arguably provides medical benefits by preventing a
possibly harmful pregnancy,151 sterilization runs counter to
asserted U.S. traditions that encourage reproduction and
individual liberty. It also conjures up the sordid history of
compelled sterilization of "feeble minded" and disabled
persons during the eugenics era, which was discredited after
World War II.152 Thus, a parents' request for sterilization is
subject to approval by an independent judge.
C. How Does Current Law on Proxy Consent Apply to

Oncofertility?
The legal treatment of parental consent regarding the
four elective surgeries discussed above can be used to create a
framework for analyzing parental consent in the context of
ovarian tissue cryopreservation. 153
The first consideration is the age of a child. If the child is
still a minor but of an age at which she can comprehend some
issues about future reproduction, she should be consulted. As
the Oregon Supreme Court noted in In re Marriage of Boldt,
at a certain age, decisions dealing with permanent alterations
of the body may affect the relationship between the child and
parent and could have a "pronounced effect on [parents']
capability to properly care for" the child. 154 Furthermore,
other courts have recognized that mature (though not
emancipated) minors, can participate in decisions about their
healthcare, even the decision is contrary to the commonly
accepted medical practice. 155 Additionally, and as described
of female genital mutilation (".I<'GM") is deemed barbaric by western cultures."}.
150. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
151. For instance, preventing a pregnancy that the minor may not be able to
handle either physically or psychologically can be considered a medical benefit.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
152. See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE
USES

Q)i'

HUMAN HEREDI'l'Y (1985); PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION:

A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN TIIE UNITED STATES (1991).
153. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 123, at 41 (listing three criteria
ethicists consider when deciding on appropriateness of consent by proxy).
154. In re Marriage of Boldt, 176 P.3d 388, 394 (Or. 2008).
155. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (IlL 1990) (holding that a mature
minor can refuse blood transfusions); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748
(Tenn. 1987); Jerry Markon, Fight over a Child's Care Ends in Compromise; Va.
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above, courts and legislatures have long permitted minors to
make decisions involving reproduction or sexual health with a
reduced level of parental control over those decisions. 156
Thus, in our view, to the extent possible, the views of the
child must be solicited and, though not dispositive, be given
due weight.
The second issue to be taken into account is the question
of how much sexual function is likely to be retained post
surgery. For instance, if the procedure involves the removal
of only one ovary, with the other remaining in place and being
counted on to provide proper hormonal balance in the later
years, there may be less concern than in cases where both
ovaries are to be excised or in cases in which the ovary to be
excised is the only healthy one. In the former cases, the risk
to the patient is rather small, and the change in natural
unassisted reproductive and ancillary sex functions is
similarly small (though appreciable).157 In the latter cases, on
the other hand, the chance of losing unassisted function is
certain,158 and the child will need perpetual hormone
replacement therapy.159 In a situation such as this, a very
careful balance must be made between the uncertain
potential for future offspring versus the real and definite
consequences of losing an organ that provides proper
hormonal balance-and perhaps also reproductive function.
The third consideration is the size of the putative benefit
of undergoing the chosen oncofertility procedure. It is worth
remembering that at this stage the science of ovarian tissue
removal for the purposes of future reproduction is at its
infancy. No live births in humans have yet been reported
following excision of an ovary and subsequent in vitro follicle
maturation and fertilization. 160 However, live births in
Judge's Order Could Have Forced Teen to Get Cherrwtherapy, WASH. POST, Aug.
17, 2006, at Al (discussiug a settlemeut between a minor child and the
Department of Sodal Services allowiug the minor to forego traditional cancer
treatmeut in favor of an alternate regimen).
156. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
157. Amir Lass, The Fertility Potential of Women with a Single Ovary, 5
HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 546, 549 (1999).
158. David Lee, Ovarian Tissue Cryopreservation and Transplantation:
Banking Reproductive Potential for the Future, in ONCOFERTILITY: FERTILITY
PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SlJRVIVORS, supra note 3, 110, 110.

159. Id.
160. See Sonmezer & Oktay, supra note 53, at 260. However, studies on mice
have resulted in live births. See Xu et aI., supra note 67, at 2739.
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humans have been reported following excision of an ovary
from tissue transplants and in vitro maturation of available
mature eggs. 161 Thus, with regard to the preservation of
human fertility, the protocol in question is at the early
experimental stages. 162 Importantly, since patients who are
five- or six-years-old today will not be in a position to have
children for another fifteen to twenty years, it may well be
that by then, the oocyte maturation process will be well
established and will result in a level of success not below that
which is expected for "regular" IVF protocols. 163 Nonetheless,
it must be recognized that at the present day, successful
preservation of reproductive ability via ovarian tissue
removal and storage is still under development.
The last issue to consider is the purpose of the parent's
decision to subject the child to the ovarian tissue removaL To
the extent that the parental decision is purely about
preserving the child's future options, it is likely to be more
acceptable to the legislatures, the courts, and the general
public. As discussed above, much turns on whether the
proposed medical procedure fits within U.S. social traditions
and norms. 164 Because the ability to reproduce is generally
valued in U.S. society and is protected by the Constitution, 165
preserving reproductive options is likely to be considered
highly beneficiaL In fact, the primary critique of the
procedures discussed above is that they ignore "the [c]hild's
[r]ight to an [o]pen [f1uture."166 Oncofertility procedures can
be seen as preserving this right.
It can also be argued, however, that parents who seek
161. See, e.g., Isabelle Demeestere et al., Fertility Preservation: Successful
Transplantation of Cryopreserved Ovarian Tissue in a Young Patient Previously
Treated for Hodgkin's Disease, 12 ONCOLOGIST 1437 (2007); J. Donnez et aI.,
Livebirth after Orthotopic Transplantation of Cryopreserved Ovarian Tissue,
364 LANCET 1405 (2004); Dror Meirow et al., Pregnancy after Transplantation of
Cryopreserved Ovarian Tissue in a Patient with Ovarian Failure after
Chemotherapy, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 318 (2005); Sherman J. Silber et a1.,
Ovarian Transplantation between Monozygotic Twins Discordant for Premature
Ovarian Failure, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 58 (2005).
162. See Xu et al., supra note 67; Telfer et aI., supra note 67, at 1155.
163. While no definitive answer can be given to the question of when and if
this project will come to fruition, given the current level of success in the
laboratory, it is not unreasonable to believe that success in humans can be seen
within five to ten years.
164. See supra Part IV.B.
165. See supra Part II.
166. Beh & Diamond, supra note 123, at 57.
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this procedure for their daughters are steering the child's
future decisions toward child bearing. Undergoing ovary
removal as a child and preserving her ovarian tissue for a
number of years may put enormous pressure on a woman to
use the stored tissue. It provides a powerful reminder
throughout the rest of her childhood and early adulthood of
parental and societal expectations that she should one day
bear children. Nonetheless, even if parental choices end up
influencing the future choices of minors, such influence is
legally permissible, as can be evidenced from a variety of
decisions upholding parental rights to raise their children in
a manner they deem appropriate. 167
On the other hand, consider the situation where the child
has very little hope of recovery, yet the parents still wish to
subject her to the ovarian tissue removal procedure in the
hope of having a genetic grandchild from their soon-to-be
deceased child. When analyzed within the above-suggested
framework, this hypothetical leads to a different result. In
this situation, it cannot be fairly said that parents are
preserving reproductive capacity and decisions that the child
can exercise upon reaching the age of majority. The parents
are preserving their own option of having a grandchild, but
not their child's options (since the child is not likely to
survive). In these circumstances, a court might decide that
the parents are not acting in the best interest of the child, but
are subjecting her to unnecessary medical procedures that
carry no benefit either now or in the future.

D. Is Failing to Preserve Fertility the Same as Active
Sterilization?
The reverse side of the question of whether parents can
consent to the ovarian tissue cryopreservation is the question
of whether they must consent to it. Do parents have a duty to
preserve their child's fertility if ovarian tissue
cryopreservation is available? Do children have a right to the
procedure even if their parents do not wish to consent to it?
Although we cannot at this stage give any definitive answers,
we will explore parents' potential legal obligations and
outline the issues that ought to be taken into consideration
when resolving these questions.
167. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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As discussed previously, parents are generally given wide
latitude in deciding what constitutes appropriate medical
treatment for their offspring. However, that latitude is
circumscribed by the requirement that parents act in the best
interest of the child consistent with not only the family's
values and morals, but also with good medical practice and
with "society's basic values."
The premise underlying parents' right to consent to
ovarian tissue cryopreservation is that the procedure
preserves the "basic" societal value of reproductive choice. It
can be argued that children for whom parents give consent
will be in a better-if not exclusive-position to exercise this
choice compared to children whose parents did not consent. 168
According to this view, parents who choose not to consent are
depriving their child of her right to reproduce. In other
words, it can be argued that parents' refusal to consent to a
viable ovarian tissue cryopreservation is, in effect, no
different. than the parents' decision to sterilize their child-a
decision that parents are not permitted to make without
judicial approval.
Sterilization involves active medical
intervention, however, whereas declining to consent to the
ovarian tissue cryopreservation is passive non-interference.
Whether this makes a difference in the legal outcome depends
on a judgment about the moral equivalency of action and
inaction in these cases. 169 That calculus may be affected by
the eventual degree of success of ovarian cryopreservation.
In contemplating what the correct answer to the above
dilemma should be, it is useful to weigh the factors discussed
in the preceding section-the balance of medical risks and
benefits, the societal acceptance of the practice, the effect on
the child's "open future," and the success rate of the
treatment po
To the extent that the minor in question can rationally
168. This would happen assuming that a way to consistently mature oocytes
from excised prepubescent ovaries will be found. Should that never happen,
excision of ovaries would be an unnecessary surgery and thus by definition, not
"good medical practice." Of course, in this situation, the question described in
the preceding section will arise again, i.e., should parents be allowed to consent
to a procedure that does not provide any foreseeable medical benefit? In other
words, the question presented in this section and the one presented in the
previous section are simply two sides of the same coin.
169. See AM. MED. AsS'N, POLICY COMPENDIUM 87 'll E-2.20 (1997).
170. See supra Part IV.C.
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consider her options and express her preferences accordingly,
that should mostly be the end of the matter. Courts and
legislatures routinely defer to mature minors' decisions on
reproductive matters. Indeed, courts occasionally defer to
minors even on life and death matters if the minor's decision
is in accord with that of the parents, and if the minor is
sufficiently mature.l7l It stands to reason then, that if minors
can choose to terminate or to continue with pregnancy, their
wishes will most likely be similarly honored with respect to
the decision to preserve future fertility.I72 Of course, this
"easy" solution does not obtain when the minor is unable to
rationally consider the various choices and come to an
informed decision. Thus, the remaining two factors need to
be considered.
First, the surgical risk of excising an ovary
minimaL
In most cases, the procedure can be performed
laparascopically.173 Although certain risks of infection and
error are present, it is no greater than risk associated with
any other surgical procedure (e.g., tonsillectomy). The low
risk of the procedure, coupled with the low burden that it
imposes on the minor, then militates toward the position that
the procedure ought to be performed. On the other hand, the
risk of being left without the ovary is significant. As
discussed previously, loss of an ovary alters the hormonal
balance and reduces the chances of in vivo pregnancy. This
very real risk counsels against performing the procedure.
Second, presently, the success rate of ovarian
cryopreservation is speculative at best. But even if it were to
171. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
172. It may be argued that the decision to abort a pregnancy does not
necessarily permanently change the child's future life, while the decision not to
preserve fertility does permanently change future options. We would respond
that while the premise may be true, it is equally true that the decision not to
abort does permanently change the young mother's future options in life. Yet,
both decisions to abort and not to abort are equally honored when made by
mature minors. We believe that decisions of a mature minor about preservation
of fertility would be similarly honored.
173. "Laparoscopy describes a group of operations performed with the aid of a
camera placed in the abdomen."
Medline Plus, Medical Encyclopedia:
Laparoscopy, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007016.htm (last
visited Dec. 22, 2008).
"The risk of intraoperative and postoperative
complications, hospitalization time, and the cost of treatment are generally
much less with laparoscopic surgery than with traditional open procedures."
THOMAS L. STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1047-48 (28th ed.
Li.ppincott Williams & Wilkins 2006).
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become as successful as established IVF procedures, the
success rate would still be quite 10w.174 If the ovarian tissue
cryopreservation rises to the same level of success as IVF, it
will no doubt be a tremendous achievement and a huge leap
forward in terms of reproductive options available to young
women stricken with cancer. That said, a thirty percent level
of success may be insufficient to definitively require parents
to take one or another course of action. 175 On the other hand,
if the ovarian tissue cryopreservation achieves significantly
higher success rates (e.g., eighty to ninety percent), a much
stronger case could be made that depriving the child of an
opportunity to decide for herself whether or not to bear
children later in life is violative ofthe child's best interest and
ought not be permitted.
The three factors outlined above, however, are not
exhaustive, for they do not take into account individual
family values that the parents hold and are likely to impart
to their child. Parents are entitled to take their values into
account in making medical decisions for their children.
Moreover, the parents may place a higher priority on their
child's current health than on their child's ability to become
pregnant in the future. They may also oppose the use of
reproduction-assisting technologies for religious, ethical, or
cultural reasons. There is no doubt that the values imparted
during the child's upbringing playa large role in the child's
own decisions during adult Hfe. 176 Thus, for example, a child
may grow up in a family that opposes procreation and instead
supports adoption (because, say, they believe that the world is
overpopulated). In that hypothetical family, the ability to
reproduce in the future would not be particularly valued.
174. As a reference point, nationwide, the success rate of IVF treatment was
around thirty percent. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 19 (2006) (stating that
the birth rate per successful retrieval procedure is 31.6% and falls to 27.7% if
one counts the women who started the IVF treatment, but whose eggs could not
be collected).
175. It bears remembering that taking out an ovary of necessity decreases
the ability to "naturally" conceive. Thus,
to trade-off a certain
reduction of that ability in exchange for a thirty percent success rate of some in
vitro procedure is a rational choice.
176. Thus, for instance, children of Republicans are more likely to remain
Republicans as grown-ups, while children of Democrats are more likely to
remain Democrats. Robert C. Luskin et aI., Issues and the Transmission of
Partisanship, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 440, 440 (1989).
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Because this value is likely to be imparted on the child (who,
given the hypothetical, would likely have been adopted), it is
more likely than not that once grown, the child will not place
a great premium on the ability to reproduce.
It is no answer to say that th~ ovarian tissue
cryopreservation simply preserves choice and does not
actually force anyone to reproduce should they not want to.
Subjecting the child to these medical procedures carries
certain finite risks. It also is potentially distracting from the
major issue facing the family-saving that child's life. Thus,
the protocol is neither cost- nor risk-free. And the benefit
that the protocol provides for the child of the hypothetical
parents described above is, at best, questionable. Thus,
deeply held family values should also be seriously considered
and taken into account in deciding whether parental
decisions not to consent are subject to judicial override.
The balance of factors, then, at present, counsels against
disregarding parental wishes to forego ovarian tissue
cryopreservation. However, as we stated in the beginning of
this subsection, we cannot, with any confidence, predict how
courts and legislatures will respond to this dilemma should it
ever arise.
By outlining this potential dilemma and
discussing the factors that are likely to influence the answers,
we are hoping to provide practitioners, patients, and the
public a framework for the discussion of these questions.

E. Who Controls the Fate ofthe Excised Tissue While the
Patient Is Alive?
Once the gametes (whether sperm or ova) are harvested
and stored (in whatever form) there is a question as to who
controls the usage of this stored material. In cases of adults,
the answer is clear. The control resides with the progenitor
herself. The right to control the fate of one's gametes,
whether these gametes are intra- or extra-corporeal, is firmly
established in the law. As the Tennessee Supreme Court held
in Davis, "the existence of the right [of procreational
autonomy] itself dictates that decisional authority rests in the
gamete-providers alone."177 Thus, a clinic cannot do anything
with the stored gametes to which the progenitor has not
agreed.
177. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992) (emphasis added).
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Children are at a disadvantage in this situation because
they may not be able to express their wishes as to any
disposition of the stored gametes, and to the extent that they
are able to express them, such expression may not be legally
binding while the children are minors. Nonetheless, we are of
the view that the only people who should have the authority
to decide the disposition are the children themselves, when
they reach the age of majority. We come to this conclusion for
several reasons.
First, the very premise of oncofertility treatment
(whatever form it may take) is to preserve the patient's
choices on whether or not to have children. 178 Any decision by
the guardian to donate or otherwise dispose of the child's
gametes would vitiate the child's ability to make future
choices. Thus, the initial procedure to preserve gametes
would become useless, and therefore, in retrospect, would be
improper, since it would serve no medical purpose
whatsoever. Second, it is well established that children are
not proper sources for organ or tissue donation. 179 Thus,
parents should not be able to donate the child's gametes, just
like they cannot donate a child's kidney or blood. Third, the
parents' decisions with respect to the minors' medical
treatment are limited by the requirement that the parents act

178. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
179. See Francis L. Delmonico & William E. Harmon, The Use of a Mirwr as a
Live Kidney Donor, 2 ML J. TRANSPLANTATION 333, 333 (2002) ("[Tlhe
Consensus Conference participants were generally opposed to live organ
donation from a minor because it obviously strains the concept of voluntarism,
the ethical underpinning of live donation."). There is a
narrow exception
for intra-family donations by minors when such a donation necessary to save
the life of another family member. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146
(Ky. 1969) (holding parents may consent to a donation from one minor brother
to another because the death of one brother is likely to
impact the
other one); see also Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Corm. Super. Ct. 1972)
(holding that parents may consent to intra-twin kidney donation); Little v.
Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Tex. App. 1979) (authorizing a transplant from a
minor incompetent donor after concluding that the donor "will receive
substantial psychological benefits" from the donation). But see Curran v. Bosze,
566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (refusing to authorize testing for bone marrow
compatibility from a minor half-sibling of the afflicted patient); In re
Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that kidney donation by
a minor to a sibling is not in minor's best interest and therefore prohibited).
Even blood donation by minors is limited. See AM. MED.
CEJA REP. 3-I
93: THE USE OF MINORS AS ORGAN AND TISSUE DONORS
(1993), available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/amallpub/uploadlmm!369/ceja_3i93.pdf.
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in the best interest of the minor.18o When parents choose to
dispose of minors' gametes, it is hard to see how they are
acting in the minors' best interest. At best, such a decision
neither advances nor detracts from minors' interests, and at
worst, it runs directly contrary to those interests.
Finally, as we discussed above, parents are not
permitted, without good cause and court approval, to forcibly
sterilize their children. 181 It seems to us that the prohibition
applies whether the child's reproductive capacity is inside or
outside the body. Any decision by the child's guardian that
would destroy or significantly limit a child's existing
reproductive capacity cannot be honored without the court's
consent. Moreover, permitting someone other than the child
to decide would create a dangerous risk of exploitation. For
these reasons, we believe that once gametes are stored, the
only person who can dictate their ultimate disposition is the
donor. In those cases where the donor is a minor, the
gametes must be stored until such time as the minor can
legally direct their use or disposition.

F. Who Controls the Fate ofthe Excised Tissue When the
Patient Is Dead?
A more perplexing question regarding the ownership of
excised and stored tissue arises if the patient dies. As
discussed above, while the donor is alive, there is no question
that she retains ownership of her tissue (unless she donated
it to someone else) and that she can dispose of it as she
wishes. The sad fact, however, is that far from all oncological
patients win their battle with cancer. Once the patient dies,
who should decide the disposition of the tissue that she left
behind?
The Northwestern University Oncofertility Project
presently employs a consent form where the patient agrees
that, should she die, the tissue will be destroyed or donated to
research. Needless to say, these options are not the only
possible ones, nor are they likely to be acceptable to all
patients. This is especially true when the patient herself is
legally and/or mentally incapable of consent. There is,
unfortunately, no American case law that directly governs the
180. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part N.B.
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disposition of gametes after the donor's death. Several cases
involving stored sperm have considered the wishes expressed
by the deceased donor during the course of his life. 182 For
example, in Hecht v. Superior Court, the California Court of
Appeal decided a dispute between the decedent's adult
children and his surviving girlfriend over the ownership of
the decedent's sperm. 183 The court held for the girlfriend
because the decedent's will, along with other actions he took
during his lifetime, clearly expressed the desire that the
frozen sperm pass to his girlfriend. 184 The Hecht court ruled
that" 'the seed of life . . . [is] tied to the fundamental liberty
of a human being to conceive or not to conceive.' . .. [T]he
fate of the sperm must be decided by the person from whom it
is drawn. Therefore, the sole issue becomes that of intent."185
These cases provide little guidance here because minor
children are often incapable of expressing or even forming
intent as to the future use of their gametes. Very young
children simply do not (and cannot) know whether or not they
would want children, let alone whether they wish to have
post-mortem children. This inability to express any intent is
especially acute in young female patients. As we have
discussed, male patients are not candidates for gamete
storage until the age of puberty.18B At that time, while they
may not be able to fully appreciate the full meaning of
fatherhood, at least they are able to express some preference
about having children. Female patients, on the other hand,
are candidates for gamete preservation at any time from birth
on. 187 Even newborn girls could theoretically be candidates
for ovarian tissue removal and preservation. It is impossible
to decide the disposition of tissue based on the intent of
children too young to form or express an intent about
childbearing. A different way of determining the disposition
of the gametes must therefore be found.
There are three basic ways in which parents may wish to
182. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993); Estate of
Kieveruagel, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1024 (Ct. App. 2008); cf Kurchner v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 858 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding
(relying on Hecht) that frozen sperm is to be treated like personal property).
183. Hecht, 20 CaL Rptr. 2d 275.
184. Id. at 289.
185. Id. at 288 (emphasis added) (interual citations omitted).
186. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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dispose of the ovarian tissue of a deceased daughter: it can be
destroyed, donated for research,188 or kept by relatives 189 for
the purpose of having the decedent's child. It seems to us
that either of the first two options is not problematic from the
viewpoint of law or ethics. If the parents decide to destroy
the tissue, it is really no different than deciding to bury their
child's body without preserving any of her tissue-a decision
countless parents make every day. Similarly, if the parents
decide to donate the tissue to research, it is no different than
deciding to donate their child's body or organs for research
again, a decision that many parents currently make.
The third option, on the other hand, raises serious
concerns. Although no American court has directly addressed
the question of disposition of a decedent's genetic material
absent clear expression of the decedent's intent, two French
courts have done so. In Mme. O. c. CECOS,190 the wife's eggs
were fertilized with her husband's sperm and stored. 191 The
husband died prior to implantation of the embryos and the
wife requested that the embryos be implanted after his
death. 192 The consent form that the husband and wife signed
prior to storing the embryos was silent on the question of
disposition in cases of death or divorce. 193 The High Court at
Rennes, France, held that, absent proof that the husband
intended his wife to be sole decision-maker with respect to the
future of the embryos, the wife had no authority to
unilaterally decide on implantation, whether pre- or post
death. 194 The case of Mme. P. c. La Grave Hopita[195 was
similar to Mme. 0., except for the fact that the consent form
signed by the husband and wife explicitly stated that consent
188. Tissue cannot be donated for transplantation with cancer patients
because the risk of cancer re-seeding is too high. See Sonmezer & Oktey, supra
note 53, at 258; see also supra text accompanying note 65.
189. "Relatives" here is broadly defined to include blood relatives, relatives
by marriage, and significant others who may not have been married to the
decedent, but maintained a committed sexual relationship.
190. Tribunal de grande instance [T.GJ.] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Rennes, June 30, 1993, J.C.P. 1994, II, 22250, 169, note Neirinck
(Fr.).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Cour d'appel [CAl [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, Apr. 18, 1994,
J.C.P. 1995, II, 224072, 301, note Neirinck (Fr.).
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of both parties is necessary for implantation. 196 After the
husband's death, the court upheld the agreement even though
the husband's consent was no longer obtainable, thus
declining to permit Mme. P. to proceed with implantation. 197
As in Hecht, both French cases held that the intent of the
progenitor is of paramount importance and is to be honored.
Where the donor expressed no clear intent to become a
parent, however, the courts will not infer it, even if the donor
is deceased.
There is heated academic debate on the proper
disposition of a decedent's genetic material. Although the
debate focuses on the genetic materials that were stored by
adult individuals (since childhood storage is a very new
possibility), much of the logic can be applied to the problem of
the disposition of stored genetic material of minors. For
instance, John Robertson argues that "directions for or
against posthumous reproduction deserve much less respect
than decisions about reproduction when one is alive,"198 thus
concluding that the surviving relatives ought to control the
disposition of the decedent's genetic material.199 On the other
hand, Professor Anne Schiff argues that whenever the
decedent's wishes are unknown, a presumption against using
gametes for posthumous reproduction should apply. 200
Professor Schiff concludes that "[r]espect for a person's
autonomy requires that an individual's body or body parts not
be utilized without that individual's prior consent,"201 at least
when not "justified by the compelling societal interest that
exists ... in saving lives and alleviating suffering.'1202
Given the academic debate, we cannot predict how courts
and legislatures would approach the issue of gamete
ownership when the late progenitor has failed to express any
wishes as to the disposition of the gametes. It seems possible
that given the general reluctance of the courts both in this
country and abroad to approve of non-consented
196. ld.
197. ld.
198. John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1064
(1994) (emphasis added).
199. See id. at 1047.
200. Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of
Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REv. 901, 945-51 (1997).
201. ld. at 951.
202. ld. at 947.
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reproduction,203 the default position may well be that the
surviving family members will be prevented from using the
deceased relative's gametes. On the other hand, given that
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (the "UAGA") reposes the
authority to donate the organs with the surviving relatives
(unless the decedent expressed wishes to the contrary), 204 and
permits the family to designate the recipient of those organs,
the courts may permit family members to do as they desire.
What is clear is that the courts are honoring the written
agreements made when the genetic material was stored. 205
Thus, it is incumbent upon any clinic participating in the
oncofertility program to develop a consent form where post
mortem options are listed and explained to the consenting
parties.
The list of options should be developed in
consultation with the clinic's attorney in light of the laws of
the jurisdiction and in consultation with a bioethicist. To the
extent possible, the views of the minor should also be solicited
as they may inform (though they may not be determinative)
any decision on the fate of the stored gametes should the
minor die.
G. Can Research on the Tissue Be Conducted and If So, What
Steps Must the Researchers Take?
Finally, we wish to consider the issue of research on the
tissue that was excised to preserve the patient's fertility. The
Northwestern University Oncofertility Project asks the
patient who has decided to freeze her ovarian tissue to donate
twenty percent of that tissue for research. Participation in
the program, however, is not predicated on consent and
women retain the option to refuse to donate. Thus far, all
women have consented to donate a portion of their ovaries to
research. Nonetheless, there is always a possibility that some
women may feel such pressure to donate that their consent is
not truly voluntary. What are the conditions that would
ensure that any consent to research on the excised tissues has
been freely given?
203. See supra notes 182-85, 190-97 and accompanying text.
204. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2, 8A U.LA 55 (2003 & Supp. 2008),
available at http://www.anatomicalgiftact.orglDesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=
1&tabid=63.
205. See, e.g. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 289 (Ct. App.
1993); Mme. P. c. La Grave H6pital, supra note 195.

714

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

lVol:49

As previously discussed, competent adult patients are
free to dispose of their tissues as they will, including donating
parts of it for medical research. Thus, overall, the guidelines
with respect to obtaining tissue for research would parallel
general guidelines on seeking patient's directives on tissue
disposition. There must, however, be additional precautions
to ensure that the decision made by the patient is truly free
from any coercive effects. In our view, the guidelines of the
UAGA are a good starting point in designing procedures
meant to eliminate coercion.
Under the UAGA, a physician who attends the death of a
donor is not permitted to be involved in the organ harvesting
or transplantation, because this may create a conflict of
interest for the physician. 206 Though in the case of donating
ovarian tissue the donor is not dead, a similar conflict may
exist. The treating physician may have a conflict (or a
perceived conflict) between focusing on treatment (whether
oncological or fertility) and focusing on research. The
physician may (at least theoretically) be swayed in his or her
efforts depending on the patient's decision to donate or not
donate parts of her tissue. Thus, taking the lead from the
UAGA guidelines, it would be best if the donation were
sought and obtained by personnel not involved with the
treatment of the patient. Ideally, the treating physician
should not know whether the patient chose to donate part of
her tissue, lest his or her reaction to the decision affect the
treatment provided to the patient.
Furthermore, in seeking the patient's consent to
donation, physicians should disclose any financial interest
they may have in the project. As the California Supreme
Court noted in Moore v. Regents of University of California, in
order for the consent to be truly free, a patient must rest
assured that the treating physician is not improperly
"influenced by a profit motive." 207 As the court observed:
A physician who adds his own research interests to this
balance may be tempted to order a scientifically useful
procedure or test that offers marginal, or no, benefits to
206. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 14(i), 8A U.L.A. 65 ("Neither the
physician who attends the decedent at death nor the physician who determines
the time of the decedent's death may participate in the procedures for removing
or transplanting a part from the decedent.").
207. Moore v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 792 P.2d 479,483 (Cal. 1990).
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the patient. The possibility that an interest extraneous to
the patient's health has affected the physician's judgment
is something that a reasonable patient would want to
know in deciding whether to consent to a proposed course
of treatment. It is material to the patient's decision and,
thus, a prerequisite to informed consent. 20B

It may be argued that in Moore, the court was concerned
with procedures being done to the patient in vivo in order to
bolster the research being done in vitro, and that the same
concerns do not apply to oncofertility research that would
involve tissue already voluntarily excised from the patient.
Thus, the argument goes, the donation to research would not
subject the patient to any additional risks, the researcher
would not have a conflict of interest, and therefore the patient
would not need to take that conflict into consideration in
deciding whether to consent to research.
While the
observation that in vitro research does not necessarily involve
any risk to the patient or conflict of interest for the researcher
is correct, this argument does not apply to oncofertility
research. For one thing, oncofertility patients, unlike the
patient in Moore, do not have diseased organs, for which they
have little use, excised.
Rather, oncofertility patients
preserve their tissues precisely because they expect to use
them in the future. Thus, they may be disinclined to
surrender any part of that tissue for fear that such surrender
would diminish their chances of having a child. 209
Furthermore, the conflict of interest may still be present. The
tissues are excised in order to preserve fertility and the
ability to have children in the future; thus, the primary
concern of physicians should be helping their patients
conceive when and if they desire to do so. Pursuing their own
research interests may conflict with physicians' responsibility
to treat their patients' infertility.
For the reasons outlined, it is critical that oncofertility
programs adopt strong guidelines that ensure that patients
can make truly informed and uncoerced decisions about
whether or not to donate their tissues to research.
208. Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).
209. To be sure, many would consent to such a donation, out of the
realization that but for research, the odds of achieving pregnancy would be
miniscule. However, it is unexceptional to conclude that at least some women
would prefer to preserve as much of their tissue as possible for reproductive use.
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H. Are There Additional Concerns?
This article is by no means an exhaustive treatise on the
legal, moral, and ethical questions that surround the field of
oncofertility. Questions of financing, religious objections, and
access must be considered both by those who set up
oncofertility programs and by those who decide on public
policy concerning them.
The Oncofertility Consortium
continues to examine these issues and we expect that future
scholarship by other members of the Consortium will expand
the analysis we provide here.
V. CONCLUSION

The emerging field of oncofertility holds out new hope
and possibilities for individuals whose fertility may be
compromised by disease of reproductive organs or medical
treatment. With further advances in the science, the patients
will retain the ability to have children and to exercise their
freedom to make reproductive decisions. However, as science
develops, the scientists and physicians also acquire
responsibilities to make sure that these advances are not
used in an unethical or illegal manner. This article attempts
to outline several difficult problems that oncofertility
practitioners, patients, and patients' families are likely to
face. We hope that our analysis will stimulate needed
discussion in the laboratories, clinics, and at the bedside, and
that through this ongoing dialogue, strong ethical and legal
guidelines will emerge.

